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COGNITIVE BIAS, SCEPTICISM AND UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard 




ABSTRACT. In recent work, Mark Alfano (2012; 2014) and Jennifer Saul (2013) have put forward 
a similar kind of provocative sceptical challenge. Both appeal to recent literature in empirical 
psychology to show that our judgments across a wide range of cases are riddled with unreliable 
cognitive heuristics and biases. Likewise, they both conclude that we know a lot less than we have 
hitherto supposed, at least on standard conceptions of what knowledge involves. It is argued that 
even if one grants the empirical claims that Saul and Alfano make, the sceptical conclusion that 
they canvass might not be as dramatic as it first appears. It is further argued, however, that one 
can reinstate a more dramatic sceptical conclusion by targeting their argument not at knowledge 
but rather at the distinct (and distinctively valuable) epistemic standing of understanding.  
 
 
1. SCEPTICAL ARGUMENTS: SOME DISTINCTIONS 
 
Sceptical arguments in epistemology usually take a distinctive form: they raise doubt that some 
epistemic standing⎯typically, knowledge, though not always⎯is as prevalent as it is ordinarily taken 
to be. To the extent that such arguments succeed, the upshot is that we know, justifiably believe 
(etc.,), much less than we supposed, and thus our total epistemic position is left worse off than 
anticipated. It will be useful to note three ways in which we might individuate varieties of scepticism.  
First, scepticism can be radical or local depending on the scope of its ambitions. At one 
extreme, one can imagine a form of scepticism that maintained that none of our beliefs could ever 
have a positive epistemic standing of any kind. This would be radical scepticism indeed. But equally 
one can also imagine sceptical arguments that merely target a particular kind of epistemic standing, 
such as our knowledge of the past, and hence which are local.  
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Second, sceptical arguments can be individuated in terms of which specific epistemic standing 
is being targeted. Ordinarily, we think of scepticism as targeting knowledge⎯either radically (e.g., 
Cartesian scepticism) or more locally (e.g., scepticism about the past)⎯but scepticism can also 
potentially target epistemic states other than knowledge, such as justification.  
Finally, third, scepticism can be motivated either empirically or on purely a priori grounds. In 
the contemporary literature at least, sceptical arguments tend to be of the latter variety. Consider, for 
example, a standard form of radical scepticism about our knowledge of the external world that appeals 
to radical sceptical hypotheses. Very roughly (the details need not concern us), this proceeds by 
arguing that since we cannot exclude these sceptical scenarios, so we lack much, if not all, of the 
knowledge of the external world that we take ourselves to possess. There is no empirical commitment 
being made here⎯the sceptic is not, for example, claiming that we are victims of sceptical scenarios, 
or even that it’s likely that this is the case. They are merely registering this possibility, and the fact that 
this is something that we need to exclude if we are to have knowledge of an external world, and then 
noting that we cannot exclude it (and that from this sceptical conclusions follow).     
In contrast, an empirically-orientated scepticism will appeal to specific empirical claims to 
motivate the target sceptical conclusion. Inevitably, scepticism of this variety will tend to be local 
rather than radical, since otherwise the scepticism would undermine the empirical basis cited in its 
favour, and so would be self-defeating. But scepticism of this sort can be no less intellectually 
devastating if successful, depending on the epistemic standing in question. If, for example, it were 
shown that we have far less knowledge of X than we hitherto supposed, and yet knowledge of X is 
something that we highly value, then this would be a troubling form of scepticism even despite being 
local rather than radical.1 
In what follows, a novel variety of scepticism will be motivated. It will be empirically-
orientated, in that it appeals to some of the latest empirical psychology on cognitive biases. As such, it 
will be a local form of scepticism. But, as we will see, the sceptical conclusion being canvassed is no 
less intellectually troubling in virtue of the scepticism being local.2  
 
 
2. BIAS-DRIVEN SCEPTICISM: TWO STRANDS 
 
In recent work, Jennifer Saul (2013a) and Mark Alfano (2012; 2014) have motivated different versions 
of a very provocative strand of scepticism about at least some kinds of human knowledge. Both Saul 
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and Alfano appeal to empirical premises, supported by the latest psychology, to the effect that, as Saul 
(2013a, 243) puts it, we ‘have very good reason to suppose that we are systematically making errors 
caused by our unconscious biases’. Furthermore, both authors take the fallout of this observation 
about bias and error to threaten the scope of knowledge that we can lay claim to. While in very close 
alignment in terms of their central objective, however, they differ with respect to which kinds of 
biases they primarily focus on. They also differ in terms of how they reason from the empirical facts 
they cite to local sceptical conclusions. 
 
2.1.  SAUL ON IMPLICIT BIAS AND KNOWLEDGE 
A bias, in the most general sense, is a disposition, implicit or explicit, to reach a particular kind of 
conclusion or outcome⎯in the kind of case we’re interested in, the outcomes will be representational. 
Call these cognitive biases.3 One kind of cognitive bias consists in ‘unconscious tendencies to 
automatically associate concepts with one another’, tendencies which, as Saul (2013a, 144) notes, can 
and often do lead to some ‘disturbing errors’. The most studied and perhaps most dangerous such 
associations involve, as Jules Holroyd and Joseph Sweetman (2015, 4) put it, ‘relating cognitive 
(including affective) content, that is mental representations or associations, to behavioural 
dispositions, in a particular context’. Examples include associating implicitly certain context-specific 
performance behaviours (e.g., academic performance, athletic performance, intelligence) with 
concepts such as racial category, religion, and so on. Call this class of cognitive bias, which we are 
typically oblivious to, implicit bias.4 
Saul gives a number of examples which help to show just how prevalent implicit biases are in 
everyday judgments, particularly regarding our judgments about individuals from stigmatised groups. 
Consider, for example, our perception of CV quality. Saul notes that in cases where the experimenter 
holds fixed all items on a CV, switching out only the names at the top, what is found is that: 
 
[T]he same CV is considered much better when it has a typically white rather than typically black name, 
a typically Swedish rather than a typically Arab name, a typically male rather than typically female name, 
and so on.5 (Saul 2013a, 244) 
 
As Saul points out, such judgments are influenced by factors to do with social category that should be 
entirely irrelevant. Another striking example of implicit bias Saul draws attention to is ‘shooter bias’, 
which skews one’s perceptual awareness. Shooter-bias cases reveal that a given ambiguous object is 
significantly more likely to be perceived as a gun rather than as something ‘innocent’ (e.g., a phone) 
when held by a young black or Muslim man rather than when held like by a young white man.6 
  
4 
Saul’s route from observations about implicit bias to a form of scepticism about knowledge 
proceeds by first noting that facts about implicit biases show that ‘we have very good reason to 
suppose that we are systematically making errors caused by our unconscious biases related to social 
categories.’ (Saul 2013a, 250) If such judgments related to social categories were rare, then this would 
motivate only a very localised form of scepticism about knowledge. According to Saul, however, such 
judgements are widespread: 
 
The problem starts to become vivid when we ask ourselves when we should be worried about implicit 
bias influencing our judgments. The answer is that we should be worried about it whenever we 
consider a claim, an argument, a suggestion, a question, etc from a person whose apparent social group 
we’re in a position to recognize. Whenever that’s the case, there will be room for our unconscious 
biases to perniciously affect us. (Saul 2013a, 255) 
 
One pervasive such arena is that of testimony, where we are subject to unconscious biases about 
testifiers’ credibility. And what goes for our assessments of testimony applies mutatis mutandis to other 
social-epistemic activities, such as considering questions, judging arguments, listening to contributions, 
and so on. It thus follows that Saul has potentially identified an empirical basis for scepticism about a 
reasonably wide class of knowledge.7 
Interestingly, Saul further argues that the extent to which bias-related doubt suggests we 
cannot properly trust, as she puts it, our ‘knowledge-seeking faculties’ generates a more powerful 
consideration in favour of scepticism than does the traditional a priori approach that appeals to radical 
sceptical hypotheses. She writes: 
 
[A] standard response [to traditional radical sceptical scenarios] is that these worries should not grip us, 
because we have no reason at all to suppose that these possibilities obtain. Doubt induced by implicit 
bias is unlike this: we have very good reason to suppose that we are systematically making errors caused 
by our unconscious biases related to social categories. (Saul 2013a, 241) 
 
Saul’s reasoning here is somewhat odd, however, in that sceptical arguments that trade on these 
hypotheses aren’t claiming that there is any reason for thinking that these scenarios obtain, or are even 
likely to obtain. As we saw above, the point is rather that our inability to exclude them is meant to 
have radical sceptical consequences, regardless of whether such scenarios are in fact likely or actual. If 
that point is sound, then it holds regardless of whether we have a rational basis for supposing that 
they do obtain. In that case, there wouldn’t be any intellectual comfort in noting that one has no 
rational basis for thinking that they do obtain, since one lacks knowledge regardless.  
Still, the wider point that Saul wants to make here, about how the form of scepticism she is 
proposing is very different from traditional forms of scepticism in virtue of being empirically 
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motivated, is certainly sound. Returning to our three-fold classification of sceptical arguments above, 
what Saul is offering us is a form of scepticism that is: 
 
(i) local, albeit such that it targets a wide enough class of knowledge to be intellectually disturbing.  
(ii) directed at knowledge; 
(iii) empirically motivated; and 
 
Moreover, we take it that the point Saul is getting at by comparing the error-scenarios involving 
cognitive bias to radical sceptical hypotheses is that the sceptical claim in play here is not merely that 
more of our beliefs are false than we were hitherto aware of (and hence that we know less than we 
thought for this reason). Rather, there is a much more disturbing claim in play, which is that even if our 
beliefs are not formed as a result of bias⎯and, indeed, even if those beliefs are true⎯the widespread 
and unconscious nature of such bias means that many of our beliefs do not amount to knowledge. 
Basically, Saul’s thought is that given that we are ordinarily willing to concede that our inability to 
rationally exclude radical sceptical scenarios can potentially undermine knowledge (scenarios which we 
have no reason to think obtain), so we should be very disturbed by the actual presence of cognitive bias 
in our judgements. Unless we are able to rationally exclude the possibility that our judgements within a 
relevant domain are subject to this bias, then they do not amount to knowledge even if they are true and 
unaffected by bias.  
 
2.2.  ALFANO ON EPISTEMIC SITUATIONISM AND KNOWLEDGE 
In contrast to Saul, Alfano’s (2012; 2014) brand of scepticism finds its source of motivation in an 
influential strand of thinking in the literature on moral psychology known as situationism. According to 
situationism, there is a body of empirical literature which demonstrates that ‘extra-agential’ 
factors⎯such as ambient light levels and sounds, ambient smells and mood depressors, the presence 
of bystanders, hunger levels and so on⎯can influence our actions and judgments to a surprising 
extent. John Doris (1998; 2002) and Gilbert Harman (1999; 2000; 2003) have reasoned from these 
kinds of empirical observations to the conclusion that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. In 
particular, the idea is that the virtue ethicist’s postulation of stable character traits—i.e., moral virtues 
and vices—in the service of explaining moral (and immoral) behaviour is empirically undermined by 
the extent to which extra-agential factors, including ones of which the subject may be consciously 
unaware, seem to be doing much of the relevant explanatory work. We thus get a kind of scepticism, 
albeit not of one the epistemological kind (i.e., which specifically targets epistemic standings) that 
interests us here.   
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This is where Alfano comes in, as he has argued that the general situationist line taken by 
Doris and Harman against virtue ethics can be extended to apply to epistemology. In particular, his 
target is a view widely held in epistemology known as virtue epistemology. This holds that knowledge is 
acquired via the manifestation of epistemic virtues, where this is a class of belief-forming processes which 
includes cognitive abilities, cognitive faculties, and intellectual virtues. Accordingly, if situationism can 
undermine virtue ethics by showing that our ethical virtues do not play the explanatory role in our 
ethical behaviour that the view proposes, then in principle the very same situationist critique can be 
applied mutatis mutandis to virtue epistemology to show that our epistemic virtues do not play the 
explanatory role in our epistemic behaviour (e.g., in the way we form beliefs) that the view proposes. 
The result would be a dilemma: either virtue epistemology must be rejected, or else one must embrace 
the sceptical consequence that we know a lot less than we hitherto supposed.  
Alfano’s (2012) redeployment of the situationist argument against the virtue responsibilist brand 
of virtue epistemology is relatively straightforward. Virtue responsibilist approaches to knowledge 
(e.g., Zagzebski 1996) insist that knowledge is the product of intellectual character virtues 
(e.g., intellectual honesty, open-mindedness, etc.,), where these virtues involve distinctive motivational 
traits (e.g., a desire for truth) and are reasons-responsive. Given the tight commonalities between 
intellectual character virtues and moral character virtues, the Doris-Harman line would seem to apply 
in equal measure to virtue responsibilists, who (like virtue ethicists) ultimately need stable intellectual 
character traits so described to play important explanatory roles. 
But many virtue epistemologists do not endorse the responsibilist model, but rather the virtue 
reliabilist model (e.g., Sosa 2007; 2009; Greco 2010). On this view, the traits doing the explanatory 
work in cases of knowledge acquisition are not exclusively conceived of as robust character traits like 
intellectual virtues, but also include cognitive faculties and cognitive abilities, such as the cognitive 
traits involved in the basic perception of one’s immediate environment. Such faculties and abilities 
can, on the virtue reliabilist model, be very specific and needn’t involve any distinctive motivational 
states or responsiveness to rational considerations. All that is required is that such abilities are in fact 
reliable (in the relevant conditions) and that they are suitably integrated with the subject’s other 
character traits so as to count as part of the overarching cognitive character of the subject.8 
Obviously, the sense in which situational factors would undermine a virtue reliabilist approach 
to knowledge is not as clear-cut as it is on the responsibilist model. Alfano (2014) himself is careful to 
limit his challenge (with respect to virtue reliabilism) to inferential knowledge. He concedes that non-
inferential knowledge will, on the virtue reliabilist model, be immune to the brunt of the situationist 
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critique. As his argument runs, however, extra-agential factors play a significant enough role in 
explaining our cognitive successes that it is implausible to regard cognitive faculties and abilities as 
playing the substantial explanatory role virtue reliabilists claim they play in cases of inferential 
knowledge. So even here, insofar as one retains one’s commitment to virtue epistemology, then a local 
form of scepticism about knowledge is the result.  
In support of his attack on virtue epistemology, Alfano (2014, 110) draws attention to the 
empirical literature on cognitive biases, such as the availability and representativeness heuristics (Tversky 
& Kahneman 1973; 1974). The availability heuristic leads people to expect that the probability of (say) 
an event is positively correlated with the ease by which the event in question can be brought to 
memory. A simple study that illustrates this idea⎯due to Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
(1973)⎯goes as follow. Participants were asked how likely it is that a random word taken from an 
English text starts with a ‘K’, or that ‘K’ is the third letter. As it happens, it is approximately twice as 
likely that a given word has ‘K’ as the third rather than first letter, but since participants tend to find it 
easier to think of words that start with ‘K’ than words that have ‘K’ as the third letter, they tend to 
judge that it is much more likely that the random word chosen will start with a ‘K’.  
One area where the availability heuristic has been especially well-documented is in the 
literature on risk perception. The more exposure one has to some perceived risk (e.g., Ebola) the 
higher one is likely to estimate the probability of the risk. For example, one who goes to a restaurant 
where conversations about Ebola can be overheard is more likely, ceteris paribus, to estimate the risk-
probability of Ebola than one who goes to a different restaurant where no such conversations happen 
to be going on.9 
One factor that is positively correlated with ease of recall (which then influences probability 
estimates) is how recently one has been exposed to some idea or concept. In one study (deTurck et al 
1990), mock jurors were significantly more inclined to regard a testifier as deceptive if the testifier lied 
after telling the truth, than were the testifier to lie and then tell the truth. In general, it seems that 
information encoded from our most recent encounters typically are (unconsciously) afforded 
disproportionate weight. 
Another well-studied cognitive bias Alfano draws attention to is the representativeness bias 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Consider the famous case of Linda. ‘Linda is thirty-one years old, 
single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned 
with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.’ 
Participants, in light of this information, were asked to assess the probability that various attributes are 
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true of Linda. Among them were that (i) Linda is a bank teller; and (ii) Linda is a bank teller and is 
active in the feminist movement. 89% of participants rated (ii) more probable than (i), even though 
this is probabilistically impossible.10 What explains this mistake, according to Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), is our instinctive use of heuristics, such as ‘stereotyping’, or judging likelihood/frequency of 
something on the basis of its perceived resemblance to the stereotype of the item or individual in 
question.11 
Putting this all together, cognitive biases (such as availability and representativeness) are just 
some of the many biases that we unconsciously employ all the time, and which illustrate just how 
highly sensitive our judgments are to things that seem entirely external to the kinds of cognitive 
abilities we regard as germane to knowledge acquisition. So insofar as knowledge is the product of 
intellectual virtue, or is gained inferentially via the use of cognitive virtues and faculties, then we have 
much less knowledge than we suppose.12 That’s a pretty broad class of knowledge, at least if virtue 
epistemology is correct (i.e., and that knowledge is not generally acquired in ways that have nothing to 
do with one’s exercise of epistemic virtue).13  
Alfano has thus motivated a form of scepticism that is, with reference to our three-fold 
taxonomy in §1, of essentially the same kind as that advanced by Saul. In particular, it is: 
 
(i) local, albeit such that it targets a wide enough class of knowledge to be intellectually disturbing.  
(ii) directed at knowledge; 
(iii) empirically motivated; and 
 
Furthermore, notice that Alfano’s situationism-driven scepticism is also akin to Saul’s bias-driven 
scepticism in another key respect, although he is less explicit about this. We noted above that Saul’s 
overarching point seemed to be not merely that some of our beliefs that we thought were true turned 
out to be false, and so not in the market for knowledge, on account of being the result of bias. Rather 
her sceptical worry was the more disturbing one that once we grant that we are regularly subject to 
unconscious bias, then insofar as we cannot rationally exclude this possibility it follows that our beliefs 
do not amount to knowledge even when true and not infected by bias.  
Although it is less clear in this case, Alfano at least seems to be making a parallel kind of 
point—viz., that once we grant that our belief-forming practices are unconsciously affected by 
situational factors in the ways he has drawn attention to, then our general practice of attributing our 
cognitive successes to our own exercise of epistemic virtue is called into question. In particular, even if 
one’s belief is the product of epistemic virtue, so long as one is unable to rationally exclude the 
possibility that situational factors are playing an explanatory role in one’s belief-formation within a 
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relevant domain, then that belief cannot amount to knowledge. And that is a far more disturbing 
sceptical claim. In any case, henceforth we will take Alfano to be endorsing, in line with Saul, the 
stronger sceptical conclusion.14 
 
 
3. RE-EVALUATING THE BIAS-DRIVEN SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE 
 
In what follows we will grant the empirical basis of the scepticism offered by Alfano and Saul. In 
particular, we are granting that the empirical support offered by Alfano and Saul demonstrates at least 
this much: that often our beliefs in the relevant domains are infected by cognitive bias—sometimes to 
the extent that they are primarily due to cognitive bias—with the result that some of these beliefs, so 
formed, are false (call this the bias thesis). In granting the bias thesis, we are thereby also granting that 
Saul and Alfano have at least motivated a limited kind of scepticism. After all, false beliefs are not 
even in the market for knowledge, and most epistemologists (and certainly virtue epistemologists at 
any rate) would surely agree that even true beliefs that are primarily the result of cognitive bias are not 
in the market for knowledge either. It thus follows from the bias thesis that, at least in certain 
domains, we know a lot less than we hitherto supposed. Call this weak bias-driven scepticism.  
 Alfano and Saul clearly want to motivate something stronger than weak bias-driven scepticism, 
however, and it is this more demanding form of scepticism that is our interest from here on in. We 
think we can delineate two kinds of scepticism in this regard. According to the first—which we will 
refer to as intermediate bias-driven scepticism—the thought is that even where epistemic virtues are 
genuinely in play in the formation of a true belief, so long as cognitive bias is also playing a role in this 
regard, even a relatively minor one, then this will infect the epistemic standing of the belief and 
thereby prevent it from counting as knowledge. An even wider class of knowledge is thus called into 
question compared with weak bias-driven scepticism. According to the second type of scepticism—
which we will refer to as strong bias-driven scepticism—even when true beliefs in the relevant domain are 
not infected by cognitive bias, since we are unable to rationally exclude the possibility that cognitive 
bias is present, it nonetheless follows that we lack knowledge. A wider still class of knowledge is thus 
undermined.  
 How persuaded should we be of these two stronger forms of bias-driven scepticism? Consider 
first strong bias-driven scepticism, which we saw was clearly present in Saul’s work, and arguably also 
present in Alfano’s work too. This sceptical line is effectively making it a requirement of knowledge 
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not only that one’s true belief be the result of genuine cognitive ability, but also that one can rationally 
exclude the possibility that one’s belief is subject to cognitive bias. Is it plausible that knowledge must 
satisfy this additional demand? At the very least it is a controversial claim to make, and will likely be 
rejected by many epistemologists of a broadly externalist persuasion (including proponents of the 
externalist wing of virtue epistemology, virtue reliabilism). After all, it is key to such proposals that a 
subject may have no rational basis at all for her beliefs. Just so long as her true beliefs are 
appropriately attributable to her exercise of reliable cognitive ability, then that can suffice to generate 
knowledge. Whether or not one is persuaded by the case for strong bias-driven scepticism will thus in 
part depend upon one’s wider epistemological commitments. Moreover, if it turns out that the weaker 
intermediate bias-driven scepticism is problematic, then that will make it even harder to make a case 
for strong bias-driven scepticism. 
 What about intermediate bias-driven scepticism, which we take both Saul and Alfano to clearly 
endorse? Here too there are grounds for dispute. Consider a subject undertaking a complex piece of 
reasoning, and in the process forming a true belief. While there is plenty of genuine cognitive ability 
on display—careful attention to the relevant facts, accurate inference, and so on—there is also some 
cognitive bias in play, of which the subject is completely unaware (the use of the availability bias, say). 
Nonetheless, the cognitive bias does not prevent the subject from forming a true belief in the target 
proposition. Indeed, in order to keep the case as clean as possible, we can stipulate that the cognitive 
bias doesn’t lead the subject to form any related false beliefs either. Here we have a case where the 
presence of the cognitive bias plays some explanatory role in the formation of the subject’s true belief, 
but where the subject’s cognitive abilities play a much larger explanatory role. If intermediate bias-
driven scepticism is right, then this isn’t a case of knowledge because the presence of the cognitive 
bias infects the epistemic standing in play. But, as with strong bias-driven scepticism, we seem to have 
a relatively austere epistemological thesis in play here, one that demands that knowledge is only bona 
fide if one’s cognitive success is exclusively attributable to one’s exercise of cognitive ability. And yet 
even proponents of the strongest form of virtue epistemology—known as robust virtue epistemology—
argue that one’s cognitive success only needs to be primarily attributable to one’s exercise of cognitive 
agency, and hence are quite content to allow other factors to play a minor explanatory role.15 Robust 
virtue epistemology is thus compatible with the idea that there could be knowledge in the case just 
described.  
 Interestingly, one of the reasons why robust virtue epistemology is thought controversial also 
opens up the possibility that cognitive bias may play a much larger role in the formation of a true 
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belief without that belief thereby being prevented from counting as knowledge. In particular, robust 
virtue epistemology struggles to accommodate the epistemic dependence of knowledge, which is the way in 
which knowledge can be dependent upon factors outwith the subject’s cognitive agency.16 Epistemic 
dependence comes in both positive and negative varieties. Positive epistemic dependence is when an agent 
manifests very little cognitive agency (i.e., much less than would normally suffice for knowledge), but 
where her cognitive success amounts to knowledge nonetheless because of factors external to her 
cognitive agency. Negative epistemic dependence, in contrast, is when an agent manifests a high level of 
cognitive agency (i.e., of a level that would ordinarily easily suffice for knowledge), but where the 
cognitive success does not amount to knowledge because of factors external to her cognitive agency. 
A simple example of positive epistemic dependence involves testimonial knowledge acquired 
mostly via trust in an epistemically friendly environment (i.e., where testimony can generally be relied 
upon). You might, for instance, learn where the bus station is by simply asking someone you meet in 
the street. In doing so, one would ordinarily be exercising a certain level of cognitive agency⎯one 
wouldn’t just ask anyone, for example, nor would one believe anything that one is told. One’s 
cognitive agency is thus playing a significant explanatory role in one’s cognitive success, and that is 
why one is in the market for testimonial knowledge (gullibility is not a route to testimonial 
knowledge). Crucially, however, in this case it is not one’s own cognitive agency that is playing the 
overarching explanatory role in one’s cognitive success, but rather one’s informant. One’s knowledge 
thus depends not only on one’s cognitive performance, but also the cognitive performance of one’s 
informant and the epistemically friendly nature of the environment.   
The cleanest way to explain what negative epistemic dependence is by appeal to an epistemic 
twin earth case.17 Imagine that we have two counterpart agents, Sam and Sam*, where Sam is situated 
on earth and Sam* is on ‘twin earth’. Stipulate that Sam and Sam* are microphysical duplicates with 
identical causal histories, and furthermore that they inhabit identical physical environments, both in 
terms of their local environment (i.e., their current environment which they are causally interacting 
with) and in terms of their global environment (i.e., the environment which they would be normally 
causally interacting with, where this could be different from their local environment). With these 
similarities in hand, let us stipulate now that Sam and Sam* both form the true belief that p, where the 
only difference in their circumstances concerns their respective modal environments—viz., suppose there 
are close possible worlds where Sam* forms a false belief that p on the same basis as in the actual 
world, but there is no close possible world where Sam forms a false belief that p on the same basis as 
in the actual world. 
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A consequence of the difference in Sam and Sam*’s modal environments is that a true belief 
which is common to both of them can differ in terms of whether it is subject to knowledge-
undermining environmental epistemic luck. After all, the true belief formed by Sam* on twin earth could 
easily have been false, though this is not so for Sam on earth. Crucially, however, Sam’s and Sam*’s 
respective true beliefs do not differ in the extent to which they are attributable to their exercise of 
cognitive agency, even though their beliefs differ in the extent to which they are susceptible to 
knowledge-undermining environmental luck. What this means is that manifestations of cognitive 
agency that would ordinarily suffice for knowledge can nonetheless fail to suffice for knowledge, even 
when the target belief is true, thanks to factors outwith one’s cognitive agency, such as what one’s 
modal environment happens to be.18 
The problem for robust virtue epistemology is that it cannot allow for cases of positive or 
negative epistemic dependence. In the former case, it is obliged to treat the subject as lacking 
knowledge, contrary to intuition. In the latter case, it is obliged to treat Sam*’s lucky true belief on 
twin earth as bona fide knowledge, again contrary to intuition. The import of this point for our 
discussion of bias-driven scepticism is that once one grants the phenomenon of epistemic 
dependence, then it is open to one to treat at least some cases involving cognitive bias as simply 
instances of positive epistemic dependence.   
Consider again our agent from earlier who is undertaking a complex piece of reasoning, and in 
the process forms a true belief. The change we make to the story is to suppose that while there is a 
significant level of cognitive ability on display, there also a higher than before degree of cognitive bias 
on display too. For example, imagine that the explanatory burden when it comes to the subject’s 
cognitive success is roughly equally split between the exercise of cognitive ability and the 
manifestation of cognitive bias. As before, however, we are stipulating here that the cognitive bias in 
play is not generating false beliefs at all, not just in the target proposition, but also in related 
propositions. Could a subject gain knowledge in such case, one where her success is not primarily 
attributable to her cognitive ability (though where cognitive ability is playing a large explanatory role)? 
Well, if one is willing to take the phenomenon of positive epistemic dependence seriously, then one 
should be at least sympathetic to this proposal, since absent the presentation of any relevant 
disanalogies, it looks to be very alike ordinary cases of positive epistemic dependence, where a subject 




Our concern is not to press this point here. Rather, the claim we want to focus upon is that 
the plausibility of both intermediate and strong bias-driven scepticism seems to depend on further, 
and contentious, epistemological commitments, and for that reason both forms of scepticism are 
suspect. As we will see in the next section, however, there is a straightforward way of motivating 




4. BIAS-DRIVEN SCEPTICISM, COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENT 
AND UNDERSTANDING 
 
In order to see why focussing on understanding rather than knowledge can help us resituate the 
stronger forms of bias-driven scepticism, we first need to make a few points about achievements, and 
cognitive achievements in particular. In general terms, an achievement is a success (within a given 
domain of endeavour) which is because of the manifestation of one’s (relevant) ability. A familiar case 
used for illustrating this idea is archery. For instance, the archer’s hitting the bull’s-eye through a 
fortuitous gust of wind is clearly a success—the arrow after all has landed right where it is supposed 
to. But this success is not an achievement, as it is the gust of wind, rather than the archer’s archery-
relevant abilities, which primarily explains why the archer’s shot hit the bull’s-eye. In short, 
achievements require success and they require the relevant manifestation of ability, but they also 
require that the success be because of the ability, in the sense that it is the manifestation of ability that 
is the overarching element of a causal explanation of that success.  
 Interestingly, if robust virtue epistemology had been defensible, then it would have led to a 
conception of knowledge as cognitive achievement. That is, robust virtue epistemology is essentially 
the view that knowledge is cognitive success (i.e., true belief) that is because of (i.e., primarily 
attributable to) cognitive ability (i.e., epistemic virtue). The phenomenon of epistemic dependence 
reveals that this proposal is untenable, however, in that there are cognitive achievements that aren’t 
knowledge (i.e., cases involving negative epistemic dependence), and instances of knowledge that 
aren’t cognitive achievements (i.e., cases involving positive epistemic dependence). Knowledge and 
cognitive achievement thus come apart in both directions.   
One putative advantage of thinking of knowledge as cognitive achievement is that because 
achievements are generally considered of special value, so we can explain why knowledge is of special 
  
14 
value.19 The idea that achievements have some special value is certainly plausible. For example, they 
seem to play an important role in a life of flourishing⎯there would be something lacking to a life that 
wasn’t rich in achievements (which was regularly ‘Gettierised’, say). For the sake of argument, in what 
follows we will grant that achievements, and thus cognitive achievements are of special value (while 
being silent about what this value consists).20  
If cognitive achievements are of special value to us, then we should be alarmed if any 
argument comes along which shows that we have far fewer cognitive achievements than we hitherto 
supposed. With that in mind, consider again intermediate bias-driven scepticism. We saw above that 
this was problematic on account of the fact that knowledge allows for the possibility that one’s 
cognitive success need not be exclusively attributable to one’s exercise of cognitive agency. Indeed, if 
the argument for epistemic dependence is right, then one can sometimes have knowledge even where 
one’s cognitive success is not even primarily creditable to one’s exercise of cognitive agency. 
Interestingly, however, if cognitive achievements come apart from knowledge in the manner just 
described, then it follows that intermediate bias-driven scepticism, while problematic when applied to 
knowledge, would have straightforward application to cognitive achievement. In particular, while it is 
possible that some level of cognitive bias might be compatible with knowledge⎯on the grounds that 
it is a variety of positive epistemic dependence⎯that obviously won’t work if we focus instead on 
cognitive achievement. After all, we granted above that the bias-driven sceptical argument does 
demonstrate that our cognitive successes in the relevant domains are not primarily creditable to our 
epistemic virtue, and that means that they are not candidates for cognitive achievements. The Saul-
Alfano line thus does have the means to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is generally regarded 
as being of special value, by showing that we overestimate the role of our cognitive agency in our 
cognitive successes.  
We can add an extra spin to this point by noting that the particular epistemic standing of 
understanding-why such-and-such is the case is plausibly a kind of cognitive achievement (henceforth, 
just ‘understanding’). In particular, one of the present authors has previously argued that 
understanding-why comes apart from knowledge in just the same way that cognitive achievement 
does. In cases of negative positive dependence, where knowledge is lacking, the corresponding 
understanding is present. And in cases of positive epistemic dependence, in which the knowledge is 
present, the corresponding understanding is lacking.21   
Rather than rehearsing these arguments here, we will instead focus on a particular example of 
positive epistemic dependence (which, as we saw above, is the kind of epistemic dependence of most 
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relevance to us), and show why knowledge, but not the corresponding understanding, is compatible 
with it. Let’s take a case inspired by the particular kind of cognitive biases explored by Saul (2013a). 
Imagine that one is interviewing a range of candidates for a position and has formed the view that X is 
the best candidate, though in a way that was in part a result of cognitive ability and in part due to 
cognitive bias, albeit bias that in this case generates true rather than false beliefs. Suppose, for 
example, that stereotyping played at least some role in the formation of the belief, but in a fashion that 
neither led to a false belief in the target proposition, nor to false beliefs in the general vicinity of the 
target proposition.  
As we saw above, on a plausibly formulated virtue-theoretic conception of knowledge, one 
which (unlike robust virtue epistemology) is compatible with epistemic dependence, one can contend 
that the target belief counts as genuine knowledge. That cognitive bias afflicts judgements of this kind 
means that one’s epistemic virtues cannot plausibly bear the overarching explanatory load in one’s 
cognitive success. But that is, as we’ve suggested in §3, compatible with them nonetheless playing a 
significant role, one that can sometimes be enough for knowledge.  
Once one grants that the literature on cognitive bias downgrades the explanatory role that 
one’s epistemic virtues can play in one’s cognitive successes in these cases, however, then it 
immediately follows that this cognitive success doesn’t amount to a cognitive achievement. But we 
contend that it also follows that one does not understand this candidate is the best candidate either, 
even though one knows this. This might initially seem surprising, but becomes more plausible once 
one considers some other cases where knowledge and understanding come apart in this.  
A child, for example, can come to know that his family’s house burned down because of faulty 
wiring because a parent told him so. But if he lacks a solid grasp of how faulty wiring could cause a 
fire, then he does not thereby understand why the house burned down. Or imagine the brilliant 
mathematician who can prove the theorem and the student who only believes it because the brilliant 
mathematician told him about it. While they both know that the proposition in question is true, only 
the mathematician understands why it is true. The crux of the matter is that when one has 
understanding, one has a kind of cognitive ownership of the fact in question⎯a concrete grasp of that 
fact, if you will. Note too that these are both cases of positive epistemic dependence, in that the 
cognitive success enjoyed by the subject with the knowledge but not the corresponding understanding 
is far less attributable to his cognitive agency, but is rather more dependent upon external factors. 
Cases of positive epistemic dependence show that one can gain knowledge without the kind of 
cognitive ownership characteristic of understanding, by in effect epistemically ‘piggy-backing’ off 
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factors which are external to one’s cognitive agency. But the thought is that understanding is not like 
this.  
Now consider again one’s judgement that the candidate is the best person for the job. On the 
supposition that the individual’s cognitive success is not primarily explained by her exercise of 
cognitive ability but also partly down to an unconscious bias, is one able to enjoy the kind of cognitive 
ownership of this fact that is characteristic of understanding? We suggest not. The positive epistemic 
dependence in play instead entails that one’s epistemic position is more akin to the maths student who 
has to take the truth of the theorem on trust. 
If the foregoing is right, then it’s apparent how Saul and Alfano are in a position to recast 
intermediate bias-driven scepticism so that it targets understanding rather than knowledge. While the 
presence of cognitive bias in these cases can only undermine knowledge if one ignores the 
phenomenon of epistemic dependence, there is no such barrier to treating the cognitive bias in play as 
undermining understanding.  
Interestingly, by shifting the target of bias-driven scepticism from knowledge to 
understanding, one can also give a fillip to strong bias-driven scepticism. For while it might be 
controversial to hold that knowledge always requires the kind of rational basis that is demanded by 
strong bias-driven scepticism, such that one must be able to rationally exclude the presence of 
cognitive bias, it is quite plausible that understanding might make such a demand. The point is that 
while knowledge is often understood along broadly externalist lines⎯such that one can know even 
while having very little in the way of reflective rational support, just so long as one’s beliefs are in fact 
formed appropriately⎯it is far less plausible that understanding is susceptible to a comparable 
externalist treatment. To understand why such-and-such is the case is, after all, to have a reflective 
grip on the matter. How could one possess such a reflective grip while lacking a rational basis of just 
this sort?  
Consider, for example, a counterpart to the person in the example just cited, who has made 
the correct judgment about whom to hire. Imagine now, however, that while she has formed her 
belief in a way unaffected by cognitive bias, she could very easily have formed her belief in part or in 
whole due to cognitive bias and have been none the wiser. Since she has no reflective basis for 
excluding such a live possibility, does she really understand why this candidate is right one for the job? 
We suggest not. Like cognitive achievement, understanding requires a particular kind of cognitive 
ownership that isn’t essential for merely knowing. But, unlike cognitive achievement, that cognitive 
ownership also essentially involves a reflective grip on the matter in hand, one that would require the 
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subject to have a rational basis to exclude live error-possibilities. Strong bias-driven scepticism is thus 
back up-and-running, albeit now targeted at understanding rather than knowledge. 
In summary, although the kind of bias-driven scepticism presented (in different forms) by 
Alfano and Saul is problematic when applied to knowledge, because it depends on wider 
epistemological commitments, those difficulties disappear once we refocus this challenge specifically 
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1  On reflection, that local varieties of scepticism could be intellectually devastating should not be surprising 
because—as with any assessment of costs—we must take in to account when assessing sceptical costs not just the quantity, 
but also the quality of what is being denied. Thus, a local form of radical scepticism could be more devastating than a 
radical counterpart in virtue of targeting a more valuable epistemic standing. For more on the relationship between debates 
about epistemic value and the problem of radical scepticism, see Pritchard (2008).  
2  For further discussion of the nature of sceptical challenges, see Pritchard (2002; 2015a, part one).  
3  See Beaulac & Kenyon (2014, 344). They note that the characterisation offered ‘accommodates the idea that 
biases can skew a process in a way that makes its outcome inaccurate or otherwise wrong, but it also leaves open the 
prospect that biases play a role in truth-conducive reasoning processes and morally unproblematic judgments or attitudes.’ 
4  In other work, Saul (2013b) uses ‘implicit bias’ more inclusively, as ‘unconscious biases that affect the way we 
perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from the groups that our biases ‘target’’ (our italics). The broader classification 
allows for implicit biases as such to include biases that terminate in action, rather than merely representation. In focusing on 
cognitive biases, our focus will be on implicit biases that terminate in representation, which are exactly the kinds of implicit 
biases that Saul (2013a) is primarily appealing to. For a comprehensive treatment of implicit bias, see Holroyd & 
Sweetman (2015). 
5  See Moss-Racusin et al (2012) and Bertrand & Mullainathan (2003) for some example studies. 
6  See Correll, Urland & Ito (2006), Greenwald, Oakes & Hoffman (2003), and Unkelbach, Forgas & Denson 
(2008). See also Saul (2013a, 245-46). Saul also discusses the related phenomenon of ‘prestige bias’, in which papers already 
published in certain high-profile journals were resubmitted with false names and non-prestigious affiliations. However, as 
Saul notes: 
“Only 8% detected that the papers had already been submitted, and 89% were rejected, citing serious 
methodological errors (and not the one they should have cited⎯plagiarism). This makes it clear that institutional 
affiliation has a dramatic effect on the judgments made by reviewers (either positively, negatively, or both).” (Saul 
2013a, 245) 
See Peters & Ceci (1982) for the seminal study of this effect. 
7  See Saul (2013a, 245-46). Implicit biases culminating in inaccurate judgments of the testimony of individuals 
from stigmatised groups, a phenomenon known as testimonial injustice, is explored most notably by Fricker (2007). 
8  For more on the distinction between virtue responsibilism and virtue reliabilism, see Axtell (1997).  
9  See, for example, Slovic (1987). For a discussion of the availability bias at work in responses to the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak, see http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/everybody-is-stupid-except-you/201412/the-heuristic-caused-the-
ebola-panic-2014. Note that risk perceptions are also subject to a range of other well-studied biases, including the 
anchoring-bias (e.g., probability estimates for a range of risks are typically within a range that tracks the first risk 
probability made salient). More generally, the anchoring bias involves interpreting a range of information in terms of the 
first piece of information⎯viz., the ‘anchor’. See Strack & Mussweiler (1997). For more on the empirical work on risk, 
and some of the philosophical issues it raises, see Pritchard (2014c; 2015c).  
10  To think otherwise is to succumb to the conjunctive fallacy⎯viz., the probability of a conjunction cannot be 
higher than the probability of one of its conjuncts.  
11  In fact, there is some cause to doubt whether the subjects in this case are making the conjunctive fallacy, but 
in keeping with the general spirit of the paper we will take the empirical work cited (and what it purports to show) at face 
value. For further critical discussion of this case, see Pritchard (2014b).    
12  Note that our focus here is on negative cognitive biases, which is those biases that undermine the reliability of 
one’s cognitive powers. Some cognitive biases are, in fact, positive, in that they can aid the reliability of our cognitive 
powers, and this can complicate the epistemic situationist case against virtue epistemology. For further discussion of this 
point, see Prichard (2014b) and Carter & Pritchard (2015).  
13  In fact, the present authors have argued elsewhere that Alfano has almost certainly underplayed his hand here, 
in that the arguments he offers against inferential knowledge apply to lots of non-inferential knowledge too, even on a 
virtue reliabilist construal. See Carter & Pritchard (2015). We will set this one side in what follows. 
14  See Carter (2015, ch. 4) for further discussion of the arguments put forward by Saul and Alfano. 
15  Versions of this thesis have been defended by Zagzebski (1996), Sosa (2007; 2009), and Greco (2009). 
16  For the main discussions of epistemic dependence, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013; 2014). Note that 
this notion is rooted in the critique of robust virtue epistemology offered in Pritchard (e.g., 2009; 2012) and Pritchard, 
Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4).  
17  See Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012) for the original description of the epistemic twin earth case. 
18  For more on environmental epistemic luck, and how it differs from other kinds of knowledge-undermining 




19  As Greco puts it: 
“Knowledge is an achievement in a sense that lucky guesses (and the like) are not. This is an improvement over 
accounts that make the value of knowledge merely practical or instrumental. Plausibly, we value knowledge (as we 
value achievement in general) “for itself,” over and above its practical or instrumental value.” (Greco 2013, 2) 
20  Pritchard has explored the value of achievements, and of cognitive achievements in particular, in a number of 
places⎯see, especially, Pritchard (2009; 2010) and Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4). 
21  See Pritchard (2009; 2014a) and Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 1-4) for the development of the view 
that knowledge and understanding-why come apart in this manner, and hence that understanding-why is a kind of 
cognitive achievement.  
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